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This study supports existing evidence of adverse domestic and international economic 
and financial spillover effects of extreme political acts. The relationship between the 
variables in the model is greater after the 9/11 event than before; the effects are greater in 
developed compared to developing banking systems; and the adverse effects had not 
dissipated in period of relative stability up to late 2004. In addition, USA political risk-
adjusted banking returns together with world-banking system returns add new 
information in explaining country-banking system political risk-adjusted returns. This 
evidence should be heeded by risk managers and bank regulators in calculations of 











The motivation for this study stems from several facts as follows: The most significant 
and tragic extreme political act in USA history was the terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Centre in New York on the 11th September 2001. This sad event also had an effect 
on financial and other markets within the USA. Historical economic and financial data do 
not fully explain stock prices and returns. Expert political risk opinions and events may 
explain more. International banks are key economic agents and banking system stock 
returns are important partial indicators of economic activity. The USA is the most 
powerful of open market economies with the most internationalised banking system.  
This paper tests the domestic and international effect of political risk and extreme 
political acts in the USA on the USA banking system. The international effect is tested on 
other developed systems (for example, in Australia and the UK) and to key South East 
Asian systems (for example in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines) where there is 
significant trade and investment with the USA including banking linkages. 
The central issues addressed in this paper are as follows: How important was the effect of 
“9/11” on the USA-banking system? How important were spillover effects on other 
banking systems? Did these effects intensify after the attacks or did they dissipate in a 
period of relative stability to late 2004? Do pure political risk-adjusted banking returns 
variables add new information to international banking markets for the use of risk 
managers and bank regulators?  
The paper is organised as follows: Relevant literature is discussed along with the concept 
of pure political risk. The data, model, methodology and preliminary analysis are then 
discussed. Finally, findings are reported and a conclusion and policy implications are 
noted. 
Theory and literature 
Authors such as, Blomberg et al (2004) and Anderton and Carter (2004) examined macro 
and microeconomic effects respectively, in relation to terrorism. Blomberg et al used 
regression and vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques to find that, on average, the 
incidence of terrorism may have a significant negative effect on growth. However, the 
effect is smaller and less persistent than that related to external wars or internal conflict. 
They also find that terrorism involves the redirection of economic activity from 
investment to government spending and that there are differences in the incidence of and 
economic consequences of terrorism in different groups of countries. Terrorist incidences 
are more frequent in developing countries. However, negative influences of those 
activities on growth are smaller in developed countries. Anderton and Carter use utility 
maximisation and game theory models to demonstrate terrorist resource allocation choice 
effects and government counter-terrorism efforts and also the strategic interdependencies 
among terrorists and governments.  
Krug and Reinmoeller (2003) find through microeconomic analysis that the process of 
globalisation changes the supply of terrorist attacks and the costs of tolerating terrorist 
hazard. Adjustments in the gains of globalisation need to be made with the added terrorist 
risk. Bram (2003) finds that the “9/11” attacks created sizeable job and income losses in 
New York, but that New York’s downturn, post “9/11”, stems largely from other factors, 
such as the state of the national economy and the financial markets.  
Other studies examine the impact of terrorism on specific industries. Blair (2002) 
investigated the economics of post “9/11” aid to airlines in the USA. Specifically Blair 
considered the merits of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilisation Acts 
passed by congress immediately after “9/11”. Blair finds that the lack of profitability of 
the industry was due to structural problems within the industry as well as fear of further 
attacks. The overall weakness in the USA economy was also a factor. The symbolic role 
of government in providing a promise of financial support to the airline industry thrust 
the US government into a questionable role of setting industrial policy at a micro-level.  
Ito and Lee (2003) assessed the effects of “9/11” on US airline demand. They find a 
negative transitory shock as well as a negative demand shock. The latter had yet to 
dissipate and could not be explained by economic, seasonal or other factors. Liu et al 
(2003) examined and compared the reaction of financial markets to the real estate market 
post “9/11”. They find that the subsequent week of share market closure gave market 
participants time to reconcile the complex impact of “9/11” on market prices. After 
“9/11” New York properties under-performed significantly compared to other US 
properties of a similar type.  
De Mey (2003) finds both direct and indirect adverse effects on the insurance industry 
post “9/11” due to the substantial direct and indirect economic losses suffered by the City 
of New York. Brown at al (2004) examined the role of the US government in the market 
for terrorism reinsurance and investigated the negative stock market responses of affected 
industries prior to the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. Poteshman 
(2003) finds, in an investigation of options market activity in the US in the days leading 
up to “9/11” that call option volume ratios and call volume indicators were at typical 
levels but that put option volume indicators seemed unusually high.  
Maillet and Michel (2005) investigated the impact of “9/11” on USA and French share 
markets. Using a methodology having a measure relying on an analogy with geophysics 
they find that the crisis triggered by “9/11” in the share markets was the worst since 1987 
and the ninth worst compared to major historical crises Hon et al (2005) modelled 
conditional heteroskedasticity to find that international stock markets, particularly those 
in Europe, responded closely to USA stock market shocks in the three to six months after 
the crisis of “9/11” than before. Their evidence suggests that the benefits of international 
diversification in times of crisis are significantly lessened.  
International spillover effects of crises in USA stock markets and currency markets have 
been previously examined (For example, King & Wadhwani, 1990; Hamao et al, 1990; 
Susmel & Engle, 1994; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000). A comprehensive literature on 
financial market crisis and contagion is covered in De Bandt and Hartman (2000).  
Straetmans et al (2003), in their main objections to spillover literature, say that 
correlation measures are non-robust to changing the underlying distribution assumptions 
of the return processes. They used extreme value analysis to assess whether or not 
downside risk measures such as value at risk and external sector linkages were 
significantly altered after “9/11”. Their evidence indicates that the potential for domestic 
portfolio diversification during crisis periods decreased. In addition they find little 
support for a structural change in downside risk before and after “9/11”.  
Whilst the methodology of extreme value analysis is compelling, the study in this paper 
is unique, as it seeks to bring political risk factors into basic international banking market 
models1. The developing and developed countries selected for this study of their banking 
systems possess robust trade and investment relationships with the USA. The developing 
country samples have demonstrated susceptibility to past currency crises and spillover 
effects (For example, the South East Asian currency crisis of mid 1997). 
Country/sovereign risk ratings compared to political risk ratings 
Country/sovereign credit rating history is published by world credit risk rating agencies, 
such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch-IBCA. The ratings scales and 
assessments are comparable. The scales extend from extremely strong ability to repay 
through to default. The agencies also report credit watches (short-term potential 
direction) and ratings outlooks (long-term potential directions). According to various 
authors (For example, Simpson, 2002) the manifestation of country risk is the inability or 
unwillingness of a country to service external debt. This implies that country risk, when 
considered as a total risk concept, has an economic/financial component (that is, a 
systematic component based on historical balance of payment data) and a human 
component (that is, an unsystematic or country specific component based on opinions on 
political outcomes that are also influenced by social and cultural factors).  
The economic and financial component is objectively assessed as it is based on fact. It is 
not avoidable as it is the same for all. The unsystematic component is largely subjectively 
assessed and thus difficult to measure. However, this component of total country risk is 
avoidable through diversification. Political risk is the slowing down in the meeting of 
external commitments due to political factors such as riots, strikes and civil unrest. This 
is related to other factors such as, the degree of corruption in government, the history of 
                                                 
1 The basic international banking market models in this paper have been derived from the work in the area of portfolio theory by 
Markowitz (1959) and from the work in Capital Asset Pricing Models by Sharpe (1964), Roll (1977) and Ross (1976). 
law and order, the quality of the bureaucracy etc. These factors have much to do with the 
social customs and cultural history of most countries. 
Simpson (2002) examined a cross sectional sample of 1995 country and international 
banking risk ratings and economic and financial data and finds the following: First, the 
risk ratings from the leading ratings agencies are highly positively correlated. Second, 
country risk ratings may be largely replicated using primarily trade performance and debt 
serviceability data.  Third, country risk ratings are also highly positively correlated with 
international banking risk ratings, thus reflecting the importance of banks as key 
economic agents. Fourth, pure political risk factors have a very small role in the ratings 
replication process. Finally, from a cross sectional analysis of risk ratings alone it is not 
possible to tell whether or not the ratings leads or lag either financial or economic crises. 
In light of the problems within cross sectional studies, it is proposed in this study that 
pure political risk time series data be combined with country-banking returns data. Pure 
political risk scores are available through the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
The basis of this scoring system is described in the section describing political risk 
scores. There is a conceptual distinction to be made between country/sovereign risk and 
pure political risk. 
The Literature on stock market returns and country risk 
Most authors have not properly differentiated between country/sovereign risk and pure 
political risk. They have analysed country/sovereign risk ratings (which have stronger 
economic and financial components) rather than pure political risk (which incorporate 
subjectively quantified opinions on political outcomes). Despite this flaw, the questions 
asked over recent years by researchers, banking regulators and investors relate to the 
importance of the impact of country/sovereign risk factors on stock market returns in 
both developed and emerging markets. Another question is whether or not risk ratings 
lead or lag financial or other crises. In other words, do the risk scores add new 
information to stock markets?  
Studies such as, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1992), Maltosky and Lianto (1995) argued that rating downgrades are informative to 
equity markets, but find that upgrades do not supply markets with new information. 
Cantor and Packer (1996) examined a sample of developed and emerging markets over 
the period 1987 to 1994 and find that risk ratings have a significant impact on bond yield 
spreads. Erb et al (1996) discussed the importance of an understanding of country risk for 
investors. They find that country risk measures are correlated with future equity returns 
but, financial risk measures reflect greater information. They also find that country risk 
measures are also highly correlated with country equity valuation measures and that 
country equity value oriented strategies generate higher returns.   
Diamonte et al (1996) used analyst’s estimates of country risk. They find that country 
risk represents a more important determinant of stock returns in emerging rather than in 
developed markets. They also find that over the past 10 years country risk had decreased 
in emerging markets and increased in developed markets. They speculate that if that trend 
continues, the differential impacts of country risks in each of those markets will narrow.  
Hill (1998) finds that in times of crisis many investors may be determined to minimise 
exposure to politically risky securities until they have more information. However, after a 
period of calm the spreads being offered appear to be too high relative to the risks. After 
more investors return to the market the spreads get less and when there is another crisis 
the cycle recommences. Specifically in regard to the Asian currency crisis, Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) suggested that ratings agencies are too slow to react and when they did 
react their ratings intensified and prolonged the crisis.  
Ferri et al (1999) argued that the agencies behave in a procyclical manner by upgrading 
risk ratings during boom times and downgrading them during crises. Reisen and von 
Maltzan (1999) argued that risk ratings agencies exacerbate boom-bust cycles in financial 
markets and put emerging markets at greater risk.  Hooper and Heaney (2001) studied 
regionalism, political risk and capital market segmentation in international asset pricing. 
They conclude that multi index models should incorporate a regional index, an economic 
development attribute, commodity factors and a political risk variable in order to more 
effectively price securities.  
Brooks et al (2004) argued that equity market reactions to ratings changes reveal 
significant responses following downgrades. Hooper, Hume and Kim (2004) find that 
risk ratings agencies provide stock markets and foreign exchange markets in the United 
States with new tradable information, where ratings upgrade increase stock markets 
returns and decrease volatility significantly. They also discover significant asymmetric 
effects of ratings announcements where the market responses are greater in the case of 
ratings downgrades.  
Busse and Hefeker (2005) explored the connection between political risk, institutions and 
foreign direct investment flows (some of which is channeled into stock markets). They 
find that government stability, the absence of internal conflicts and ethnic tensions, basic 
democratic rights and the ensuring of law and order are highly significant determinants of 
foreign investment flows. 
The evidence overall supports a “9/11 spillover effect” in economies, industries, and 
share markets. The evidence is mixed but, mostly points to country/sovereign risk having 
a significant relationship with stock market returns. Some of the above arguments imply 
that financial crises, as reflected in reduced stock market returns, are the drivers of 
sovereign risk ratings. If this is the case, risk ratings agencies do not contribute new 
information to financial and banking markets.  
What is pure political risk? 
Economic and financial risk has nothing overtly to do with pure political risk, although it 
is arguable that under the surface, the unwillingness to service external debt may be 
influenced by acute shortages of foreign exchange (Bourke & Shanmugam, 1990). Pure 
political risk according to ICRG relates to political stability as evidenced by expert 
opinions collected, collated and categorised on areas as follows: Government stability, 
socio economic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict (where 
the ratings ascribed are out of 12), corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law 
and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability (where the ratings are out of 6), and 
the quality of bureaucracy (where the ratings are out of 4). According to ICRG, in each 
category, the numerically higher the score or rating the lower the risk. The descriptions of 
the various components of pure political risk are included in Appendix 4.  
The data 
Daily banking stock market price index data for the world-banking system, the USA-
banking system and sampled country-banking systems are converted to returns series. 
The USA and the country-banking returns data are combined with political risk scores. 
The returns data are extracted from Datastream for the period 31st December 1999 to 17th 
September 2004. Political risk ratings are collected from the ICRG database over the 
same period.  
For the purposes of this paper, the composite political risk scores (combining all of the 
pure political risk components and subcomponents as referred to in Appendix 4) ascribed 
by ICRG out of 100 for each country, are reversed to reflect that low numerical risk 
scores equate to low levels of risk and high numerical risk scores equate to high levels of 
risk. That is, composite political risk ratings out of 100 are extracted for each country in 
the sample and deducted from 100.  
The resultant numbers are then multiplied by daily banking stock market index returns to 
arrive a country-political risk value associated with that country’s banking returns. Low 
values of the country-banking system variable are associated with lower political risk for 
a given level of return. The data are analysed using the EViews (2001) statistical 
package. Note that during the analysis and findings reference occasionally is made to 
country-banking systems/variables, a world banking system/variable and the USA-
banking system/variable. These variables, except for the world banking system variable, 
are country-banking system returns that are political risk-adjusted. The world banking 
system/variable is a world banking stock index returns variable. 
The Model and Methodology 
The first step is the specification of a basic systemic international banking market model 
of unlagged country-banking variables 2 regressed against the world-banking stock price 
index returns and the USA-banking variable.  
                                                 









. Where P represents the banking share price index values at times t and t-1. 
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Where; 
ti
PolR is political risk adjusted banking returns in country-banking system i at time t   
tW
R is the return on world-banking system’s price index i at time t .  
ti




γ are the regression coefficients. 
tUSA
PolR is political risk adjusted banking returns in the USA banking system.  
ti
e is the error term of the regression. 
A negative relationship between the US banking variable and the other country-banking 
variables means that higher political risk in the US banking system is associated with 
lower political risk in a country-banking system for a given level of return. A positive 
relationship between the world-banking returns variable and the country-banking system 
variables means that lower world-banking returns are associated with lower country-
political risk for a given level of country-banking returns. This would be consistent with 
the finance theory in the risk/return tradeoff and would make comment about relative 
riskiness in a country-banking system after an extreme political act. 
Based on Granger (1988) findings that financial and economic time series may contain 
unit roots and on the development of the theory of non-stationary time series analysis, the 
unlagged regression models are re-specified into a model to implement VAR based tests 
of cointegration and causality. The international banking market VAR model involves 
lagged data in world-banking returns and country-political risk-adjusted returns from 
Equation 1. 
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By implication, all variables in the multivariate model described in Equation 2 are 
optimally lagged. Equations 1 and 2 are tested over the full period of the study and in a 
“before and after window” on the “9/11” event. 
Preliminary analysis 
Prior to testing the models, analysis is undertaken to demonstrate the basic facts and 
assumptions relating to the global influence of the USA-banking system. In this part of 
the analysis only prices rather than risk-adjusted returns are examined. The level series of 
prices are found to be non-stationary and the errors of associated regressions reveal serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity according to Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root 
tests (Dickey & Fuller, 1981), Durbin Watson (DW) tests (Durbin & Watson, 1971) and 
White tests. In the presence of serial correlation, the level series regressions are regarded 
as spurious.  
The preliminary analysis moves to first differences. Each banking system in first 
differenced price index values is regressed on the world-banking system in first 
differenced price index values. All data are found to be stationary processes. The errors 
of the regressions are found to be stationary. The errors of the regressions are not serially 
correlated according to DW tests. However, heteroskedasticity is found to be persistent 
according to White tests.  On that basis weighted least squares replace ordinary least 
squares (OLS)3 regression analysis. 
Table 1 shows the results of the preliminary analysis. The ranking of global influence in 
banking is shown in Column 2. The USA model has the greatest explanatory power. The 
results demonstrate that, in an overall comparison of the selected country-banking 
systems, the developed country system regressions (particularly those for the USA and 
                                                 
3 Deemed more suitable in the presence of heteroskedasticity of an unknown form. 
the UK) have higher adjusted R square values, higher regression coefficients, higher t 
statistics and lower standard errors than the developing country systems. The analysis of 
prices is a useful initial indicator of the importance of the USA-banking system in a 
global context.  
Table 1 
 
Regression analysis of country-banking systems interacting with the world-banking 
system in first differenced prices 
 
Country and regional 
banking price index   
First differences 
regressed on the world-
banking price index 
first differences: 
(1) 
Rank (Adjusted R 
Square value and t 
statistic value) 
(2) 






t statistic for regression 
coefficient 
(5) 
USA 1 0.6340 1.4740 46.1639   
UK 2 0.4546 7.3415 32.0174   
Australia 3 0.0354 0.2116 6.7778   
Thailand 4 0.0235 0.0617 5.4680   
Malaysia 5 0.0061 0.0926 2.8017  ** 
Philippines 6 0.0014 0.0248 2.0180 ** 
 
Note: All t statistics are significant at the 1% level except those marked ** where significance is at the 5% level. The ranking is 
according to explanatory power in the adjusted R square and the t statistic values.  
 
Main findings 
The first step following preliminary investigation is to undertake regression analysis of 
unlagged data testing the specified models that incorporate political risk ratings. 
Weighted least squares regression analysis (See Equation 1) of unlagged data is examined 
initially for the full period of the study by regressing each country-banking system 
variable on the world-banking system and the USA-banking system variables.  
Regression analysis of unlagged data 
Full period 
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis, testing the full period of the study from 31st 



















Note: All values are significant at the 5% level. The country-banking system is the dependent variable. 
 
These results demonstrate that there are statistically significant interrelationships between 
each country-banking system, the world-banking system and the USA-banking system 
over the full period of the study. The sizes of the adjusted R square values, coefficients 
and t statistics indicate that the developed country-banking system regressions of the UK 
and Australia exhibit greater explanatory power than the developing country-banking 
systems. The signs of the coefficients and t statistics show that there is a positive 
relationship between country-banking system variables and the world-banking system 
returns variable. That is, higher levels of world-banking returns are associated with 
higher levels of country-political risk-adjusted banking returns. This is consistent with 
theory in the risk return tradeoff and confirms greater financial integration of the 
developed country-banking systems with the USA system. 
A negative relationship exists with the country-banking system variable and the USA-
banking system variable. That is, higher levels of political risk-adjusted banking returns 
in the USA-banking system are associated with lower levels of political risk-adjusted 
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developed banking systems of the UK and Australia. As political risk in the USA-
banking system increases, it is evident that perceived political risk in other sampled 
country-banking systems in the UK, Australia and in South East Asia reduces for a given 
level of banking returns. The study is then expanded to the before and after window of 
“9/11” to demonstrate the spillover effect. 
Structural breaks tests for “9/11” 
Each regression is tested at the 5% level of significance using Chow forecast and 
breakpoint tests including “9/11” as the date for testing. The values of the F statistics and 
log likelihood ratios and their significance provide confirmation of structural breaks in 
the data for each country-banking system regression except for that of the Philippines.  
Periods before and after “9/11” 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis before and after the “9/11” attacks 
and compares the results to those from Table 2. The interest lies in the periods before the 
terrorist attacks from 31st December 1999 to 10th September 2001 and after the terrorist 
attacks from the 12th September 2001 to 17th September 2004. In each case, for both 
developed and developing country-banking systems, the explanatory power of the 
regressions is greater in the period after “9/11”. This again is indicated in the values of 
the adjusted R square values, coefficients and t statistics. Note that the results for the 
Philippines and the Malaysian banking systems interacting with the world-banking 
system and the USA-banking system are not significant in the period before “9/11” but, 
are significant in the period after “9/11”. The interaction of the developed country-
banking systems of the UK and Australia is greater than that for the developing country-
banking systems in the periods before and after “9/11” and during the full period of the 
study. 
Table 3 





31/12/1999 to 17/09/2004 
(Full period of Sample) 
31/12/1999 to 10/09/2001 
(Before “9/11”) 
12/09/2001 to 17/09/2004 
(After “9/11”) 
Adjusted R Square 0.5503 0.5073 0.5818 
World Returns Coefficient 0.1996 0.1803 0.2149 
World Returns t Statistic 33.6282 18.9608 28.3656 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
Coefficient 
-0.3349 -0.4904 -0.3315 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
t Statistic 
-14.9014 -9.5403 -12.4844 
AUSTRALIA    
Adjusted R Square 0.0708 0.0648 0.0898 
World Returns Coefficient 0.0463 0.0527 0.0474 
World Returns t Statistic 9.7457 5.6534 8.6471 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
Coefficient 
-0.1278 -0.2175 -0.1097 
USA-political Risk t Statistic -7.1068 -5.1711 -5.7083 
THAILAND    
Adjusted R Square 0.0571 0.0470 0.0740 
World Returns Coefficient 0.2476 0.2974 0.2543 
World Returns t Statistic 8.6479 4.8330 7.8511 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
Coefficient 
-0.6890 -1.0942 -0.6149 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
t Statistic 
-6.3543 -4.1930 -5.4167 
PHILIPPINES     
Adjusted R Square 0.0045 0.0042* 0.0144 
World Returns Coefficient 0.0572 0.0154* 0.0813 
World Returns t Statistic 2.6936 0.3432* 3.5266 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
Coefficient 
-0.1666 0.0029* -0.2398 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
t Statistic 
-2.0735 0.0146* -2.9701 
MALAYSIA    
Adjusted R Square 0.0205 0.0065 0.0538 
World Returns Coefficient 0.0883 0.4740* 0.2111 
World Returns t Statistic 5.0836 1.2270* 6.8951 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
Coefficient 
-0.3094 -0.3359 -0.3451 
USA-political Risk in Returns 
t Statistic 
-4.7028 -1.9266 -5.6059 
 
Note: All values are significant at the 5% level. * Denotes not significant. 
 
It is evident that the “9/11” attacks induced structural changes in banking returns and 
political risk data, because after “9/11” the interrelationships in political risk and banking 
returns between country, world and USA banking systems are stronger. Spillover effects 
are also demonstrated. After the attacks there is a stronger positive relationship between 
world-banking returns and the country-banking system variables. This effect remains 
stronger in the developed country-banking systems of the UK and Australia. After 
“9/11”, there is a stronger negative relationship between USA-political risk associated 
with USA-banking returns and political risks associated with country-banking returns.  
VAR: Causality Analysis of Lagged Data 
Equation 2 is analysed in VAR based Johansen cointegration and Granger causality tests 
to confirm exogeneity and to verify the regression specification in Equation 1. The VAR 
stability condition checks in each case shows that no roots lie outside the unit circles and 
that each of the VARs satisfy the stability condition check. Lag order selection is 
undertaken by examination of the maximum value of Schwartz information criteria4. Unit 
root tests (ADF and PP) show that the study is dealing with integrated non-stationary 
processes. Evidence of a long-term cointegrating relationship is found in each country-
banking model. However, the more important objective of this study is to examine 
exogeneity. Tests indicate an optimal lag order of 1-2. Using this VAR lag order, VAR 
based pairwise Granger causality/block exogeneity Wald tests are undertaken over the 
full period of the study, and then for the periods before and after “9/11”, to  confirm 
exogeneity. Significance levels were set at 5% for the sizes of the respective Chi Square 
values (See Appendices 1 to 3).  
Full period 
Granger causality results are summarised in Appendix 1. It is noted that, in each country-
banking system VAR, the USA-banking system Granger causes the world-banking 
returns system. In addition, the world-banking system does not significantly Granger 
                                                 
4 Patterson (2000) suggests that Swartz information criteria may be used in preference to other criteria such as Akaike to 
simultaneously estimate lag order and cointegrating rank. Alternatively an information criterion such as Akaike or Swartz can be used 
to determine the lag order and then the Johansen procedure (Johansen, 1988) can be used to estimate the cointegrating rank. This 
paper uses both the Swartz criterion and the Johansen test to estimate lag order and cointegrating rank. 
cause the country-banking systems except in the cases of those for Thailand (at the 5% 
significance level) and the Philippines (at the 1% significance level). In the case of the 
UK banking system VAR, the USA-banking system is exogenous (significant at the 1% 
level). In the case of the Australian banking system VAR, the USA-banking system is 
exogenous (at a significance level of 1%). In the cases of the Thai and Philippines 
banking system VARs there is no significant evidence of exogeneity of the USA-banking 
system. In the case of the Malaysian banking system VAR, the USA-banking system is 
exogenous, but the evidence is not highly significant at the 10% level.  
Period before “9/11” 
 Granger causality results are summarised for the period before “9/11” in Appendix 2. 
Over the period from 31st December 1999 to 10th September 2001, the USA-banking 
variable is exogenous in the UK, the Australian and the Philippines banking systems (in 
the latter two cases the significance level is less, at 5%). There is no significant Granger 
causality running from the USA-banking system to the Thai or Malaysian systems. The 
USA-banking system and the world-banking system are exogenous when considered 
together interacting with each country-banking system (at significance levels of 1%). In 
each country-banking system VAR, the USA-banking system Granger causes the world-
banking system at a significance level of 1%. In the cases of the Philippines and the 
Malaysian banking systems Granger causality lies with the world-banking system at 
significance levels of 1% and 10% respectively. 
Period after “9/11” 
Appendix 3 summarises the results of Granger causality tests for the period after “9/11”. 
In each country-banking system VAR, Granger causality runs from the USA-banking 
system to the world-banking system (at significance levels of 1%). In addition, the USA-
banking system is exogenous (significant at the 1% level), when considered separately to 
the world-banking system, in each country-banking system except that of the Philippines. 
In the case of the Thai banking system, the significance level of the exogeneity of the 
USA-banking system is less, at 5%. In the cases of the Philippines and Malaysian VARs, 
the world-banking system is exogenous with significance at the 1% level. In each 
country-banking system VAR, exogeneity lies with the world-banking system and the 
USA-banking system when these variables were considered together (with significance 
levels at 1% in each case). These relationships are stronger than before “9/11”. 
Conclusion 
The “9/11” terrorist attacks were tragic examples of extreme political acts. The evidence 
of studies finding adverse macro-economic and micro-economic, industrial and spillover 
effects are generally supported in this paper. For example, macro and micro-economic 
effects (Blomberg et al, 2004; Anderton & Carter, 2004; Krug & Reinmoeller, 2003; 
Bram, 2003); industrial effects in the airlines industry (Blair, 2002; Ito & Lee, 2003);  in 
real estate (Liu et al, 2003); in insurance (de May, 2003);  in reinsurance and stock 
markets (Brown, 2004);  in options markets (Poteshman, 2003); in stock markets (Mailler 
& Michel, 2005; Hon et al, 2005) and in spillover affects. 
Banks are key economic agents. Banking system returns are also domestic and 
international economic indicators. This study differs from other studies in that an 
international banking market model has been adapted to incorporate pure political risk 
ratings (reflecting political, cultural and social factors) rather than country/sovereign risk 
ratings (largely reflecting finance and economic factors). For example, country/sovereign 
risk indicators were used by Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holt and Leftwich, 
1992; Cantor and Packer, 1996; Erb, Harvey and Viskanta, 1996.  Fewer studies have 
more appropriately examined pure political risk effects in investment flows (For example, 
Busse & Hefeker, 2005). The study expands on the use of single period regression 
models by also specifying bivariate models of optimally lagged data in order to test for 
cointegration and exogeneity.  
When pure political risk-adjusted country-banking returns are incorporated into basic 
banking market models it is shown that the USA banking system is a powerful exogenous 
force in global banking. It is demonstrated that spillover effects of an extreme terrorist act 
in the USA are felt in related banking systems and economies. The models possess 
greater explanatory power after ‘9/11” than before. In addition, it is shown that the 
spillover effects are greater in developed banking systems than in the developing country-
banking systems studied over the full period of the study as well as in the periods before 
and after “9/11”. The spillover effects of “9/11” had not dissipated up to late 2004. Pure 
political risk-adjusted banking returns of the USA included in country-political risk 
adjusted returns models, considered with world banking stock returns, are exogenous. 
Therefore, new information is added by these variables which, should be of use to risk 
managers making portfolio diversification decisions and for banking regulators as they 
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Appendix 1:  
 
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block 
Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Full period of study 
 
Sample: 12/31/1999 9/17/2004 
  Included observations: 1229 
Dependent variable: PRUK 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
WORLDR  3.039567 2  0.2188 
PRUSA  50.74506 2  0.0000 
All  110.3187 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRUK  1.316913 2  0.5176 
PRUSA  26.49546 2  0.0000 
All  33.28181 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRAUST 
WORLDR  3.986414 2  0.1363 
PRUSA  20.49746 2  0.0000 
All  109.4474 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRAUST  1.671727 2  0.4335 
PRUSA  32.14301 2  0.0000 
All  33.64589 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRTHAI 
WORLDR  8.462437 2  0.0145 * 
PRUSA  3.895643 2  0.1426 
All  33.62192 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRTHAI  2.110750 2  0.3481 
PRUSA  28.97390 2  0.0000 
All  34.09639 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRPHIL 
WORLDR  15.65649 2  0.0004  
PRUSA  1.775743 2  0.4115 
All  31.66339 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRPHIL  1.636253 2  0.4413 
PRUSA  32.31962 2  0.0000 
All  33.60949 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRMAL 
WORLDR  3.759182 2  0.1527 
PRUSA  5.924085 2  0.0517** 
All  45.25521 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRMAL  7.973887 2  0.0186 
PRUSA  29.85123 2  0.0000 
All  40.11273 4  0.0000 
 
Note: All results are significant at the 1% level except for * denoting significant at the 5% level and ** denoting significance at 
10% level. 
 
Appendix 2:  
 
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block 
Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Period before “9/11” 
 
Sample: 12/31/1999 9/10/2001 
Included observations: 440 
Dependent variable: PRUK 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
WORLDR  2.476348 2  0.2899 
PRUSA  23.34173 2  0.0000 
All  45.78406 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRUK  1.134551 2  0.5671 
PRUSA  11.75243 2  0.0028 
All  13.06983 4  0.0109 
Dependent variable: PRAUST 
WORLDR  0.389034 2  0.8232 
PRUSA  8.019756 2  0.0181* 
All  39.45290 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRAUST  3.064222 2  0.2161 
PRUSA  13.58380 2  0.0011 
All  15.05255 4  0.0046 
Dependent variable: PRTHAI 
WORLDR  1.477496 2  0.4777 
PRUSA  1.259337 2  0.5328 *** 
All  17.62615 4  0.0015 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRTHAI  0.335237 2  0.8457 
PRUSA  11.24989 2  0.0036 
All  12.24854 4  0.0156 
Dependent variable: PRPHIL 
WORLDR  14.29708 2  0.0008 
PRUSA  6.971671 2  0.0306* 
All  16.11542 4  0.0029 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRPHIL  0.540414 2  0.7632 
PRUSA  11.79301 2  0.0027 
All  12.45936 4  0.0142 
Dependent variable: PRMAL 
WORLDR  5.399068 2  0.0672** 
PRUSA  3.034756 2  0.2193 
All  19.43505 4  0.0006 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRMAL  8.547731 2  0.0139 
PRUSA  11.67367 2  0.0029 
All  20.68682 4  0.0004 
 
Note: Significance levels are at 1%. * denotes significance at the 5% level.  ** denotes significance at the 10% level. *** 
denotes not significant. 
Appendix 3:  
 
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block 
Exogeneity Wald Tests 
The Period after “9/11” 
 
 
Sample: 9/12/2001 9/17/2004 
Included observations: 788 
Dependent variable: PRUK 
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob. 
WORLDR  4.655186 2  0.0975 
PRUSA  35.93003 2  0.0000 
All  72.13724 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRUK  1.946276 2  0.3779 
PRUSA  18.64862 2  0.0001 
All  24.69023 4  0.0001 
Dependent variable: PRAUST 
WORLDR  3.645413 2  0.1616 
PRUSA  16.25579 2  0.0003 
All  78.11464 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRAUST  2.002863 2  0.3674 
PRUSA  22.29512 2  0.0000 
All  24.74846 4  0.0001 
Dependent variable: PRTHAI 
WORLDR  5.916768 2  0.0519 
PRUSA  6.801966 2  0.0333* 
All  19.04793 4  0.0008 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRTHAI  2.322819 2  0.3130 
PRUSA  19.71049 2  0.0001 
All  25.07771 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRPHIL 
WORLDR  11.73678 2  0.0028 
PRUSA  1.366100 2  0.5051 
All  29.87633 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRPHIL  3.727278 2  0.1551 
PRUSA  23.38002 2  0.0000 
All  26.52297 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: PRMAL 
WORLDR  13.17172 2  0.0014 
PRUSA  12.39262 2  0.0020 
All  46.92474 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: WORLDR 
PRMAL  2.795639 2  0.2471 
PRUSA  20.86867 2  0.0000 
All  25.56426 4  0.0000 
 




DEFINITIONS OF COMPONENTS OF PURE POLITICAL RISK SCORES (SOURCED FROM ICRG, 1995) 
 
Government stability ratings by ICRG are an assessment of a government’s ability to remain in office by carrying out 
declared policy plans. The subcomponents of this factor are government unity, legislative strength and popular support. 
Socio-economic conditions relate to pressures that conspire to constrain government action or to fuel social 
dissatisfaction. The subcomponents in this category are the level of unemployment, the degree of consumer confidence 
and the level of poverty.  
 
The investment profile factor affects the risk to investment not covered by other political, economic and financial 
components and is made up of contract viability and expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment delays. Internal 
conflict is an assessment of political violence in a country and its impact on governance. The highest rating means that 
there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not engage in arbitrary violence 
(either direct or indirect) against its own people. Under this rationale the lowest scores would apply to those countries 
where there is ongoing civil war. The subcomponents of this risk factor are thus, civil war or coups threat, terrorism or 
political violence, and civil disorder. 
  
External conflict measures are an assessment of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, which 
includes non-violent external pressure (for example, diplomatic pressure, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, 
territorial disputes, and sanctions) to violent external pressure (such as, cross-border disputes and all-out war).  The 
subcomponents of this category of pure political risk are cross-border conflict, and foreign pressures.  
 
Corruption is an internal assessment of the political system.  Corruption distorts the economic and financial 
environment and reduces the efficiency of government and business in the way the foreign direct investment is handled. 
Corrupt practices enable people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. By so doing, an 
inherent instability is introduced into the political process. Examples of corruption include special financial payments 
and bribes, which ultimately may force the withdrawal of or withholding of a foreign investment. However, excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favour for favours”, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between 
government and business have a lot to do with corruption. A black market can be encouraged with these forms of 
corruption. The potential downside is that popular backlash may lead to the rendering of the country ungovernable. 
 
Military in politics is a problem because the military are not democratically elected. Their involvement in politics is 
thus a diminution of accountability. Other substantial ramifications are that the military becomes involved in 
government because of an actual or created internal or external threat. Government policy is then distorted (for 
example, defence budgets are increased at the expense of other pressing budgetary needs). Inappropriate policy changes 
may be a result of military blackmail. A full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. Business risks may be 
reduced in the short-term but in the longer-term the risk will rise because the system of governance is susceptible to 
corruption and because armed opposition in the future is likely. In some cases, military participation will represent a 
symptom rather than a cause of higher political risk. Religious tensions emanate from the domination of society and or 
governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law and order by religious law. Other religions are 
excluded from the political and social process. The risk involved in such scenarios involves inexperienced people 
dictating inappropriate policies through civil dissent to outright civil war. 
 
The law and order components are assessments of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular 
observance of the law respectively. Ethnic tensions relate to racial, nationality or language divisions where opposing 
groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. The democratic accountability component is a measure of how 
responsive government is to its people. The less responsive it is the greater the chance that the government will fall. 
This fall will be peaceful in a democratic country but possible violent in a non-democratic country. The ratings by 
ICRG differentiate between alternating democracies5, ranging through denominated democracies, de facto one party 
states, de jure one party states, to autarchy6. In these ratings the lowest risk applies to alternating democracies and the 
highest risk applies to autarchies. The institutional strength and the quality of the bureaucracy is a measure that 
reflects the revisions of policy when governments change. Low risk in this area applies to countries where the 
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without major changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services. That is, bureaucracies have a degree of autonomy from political pressure with an established independent 
mechanism for recruitment and training.  
                                                 
5 Characterised by free and fair elections for the legislature and executive, constitutions, more than one political party, checks and 
balances in executive, legislative and judicial functions, an independent judiciary, and constitutional protection of human liberties. 
 
6 Where leadership of the state is by a group or an individual without being subject to any franchise, either through military might or 
inherited right. 
 
